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The Adamson Law Decision
By CHARLES KELLOGG BuIumcK'
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in support-
ing the Adamson Law2 is of vast importance, not only because of
what the court actually decide, but also because of what the opinions
suggest. In the first place the court, although unfortunately divided
five to four, uphold the law viewed both as a regulation of hours of
work and as a regulation of wages. This is not the first time that
statutes regulating hours of work have been upheld, but there is a
difference here. State statutes regulating hours of work have been
upheld in the past under the police power of the state on the ground
that the character of certain employments, such as mining, makes
long hours a particular menace to the health and safety of the
employees, 3 or that certain classes of persons, such as women and
children, are particularly injured by long hours of work,4 or on the
'Professor of Law in the Cornell University College of Law.
'Wilson v. New, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298 (1917).
The important parts of the law are as follows:
"An Act to establish an eight-hour day for employees of carriers engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce, and for other purposes.
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That beginning January first, nineteen hundred
and seventeen, eight hours shall, in contracts for labor or service, be deemed a
day's work and the measure or standard of a day's work for the purpose of
reckoning the compensation for services of all employees who are now or may
hereafter be employed by any common carrier by railroad, except railroads
independently owned and operated not exceeding one hundred miles in length,
electric street railroads, and electric interurban railroads, which is subject to the
provision of the Act of February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty seven,
entitled, 'An Act to Regulate Commerce', as amended, and who are now or may
hereafter be actually engaged in any capacity in the operation of trains used for
the transportation of persons or property on railroads, except railroads inde-
pendently owned and operated not exceeding one hundred miles in length,
electric street railroads, and electric interurban railroads * * * *
"Sec. 2. That the President shall appoint a commission of three, w]lich shall
observe the operation and effects of the institution of the eight-hour standard
work-day as above defined and the facts and conditions affecting the relations
between such common carriers and employees during a period of not less than
six months nor more than nine months, in the discretion of the commission,
and within thirty days thereafter such commission shall report its findings to the
President and Congress; * * * *
"See. 3. That pending the report of the commission herein provided for and
for a period of thirty days thereafter the compensation of railway employees
subject to this Act for a standard eight-hour workday shall not be reduced below
the present standard day's wages, and for all necessary time in excess of eight hours
such employees shall be paid at a rate not less than the pro rata rate for such
standard eight-hour workday.
"See. 4. That any person violating any provision of the Act shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not less than $xoo and
not more than $I,ooo, or imprisoned not to exceed one year, or both."
$Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1898).4Muller v. Oregon, 2o8 U. S. 412 (1go8); Sturges Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231
U. S. 32o (I913); People v. Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395 (1915).
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ground that all excessive work is injurious to the worker and so to
the community.5 And federal statutes regulating hours of work
have been heretofore upheld under the commerce clause on the ground
that they tended to make transportation more safe.6 In all of these
cases the hours of work were limited to protect some class of society
or society as a whole from the injurious results of overwork.
But in the present case the regulation of hours is not upheld as a
method of preventing the injurious effects of overwork. Its whole
justification is found in the fact that it is a reasonable means of
preventing the interruption of interstate commerce. Under this
theory the test is not the reasonableness of the hours fied, but the
reasonableness of hour-fixing as a means of protecting interstate
commerce from interruption. It is interesting to note that the
majority of the court found no difficulty in reaching the conclusion
that the statute is constitutional as a regulation of hours of work.
Mr. Chief Justice White dismissed the question with this curt remark:
"We put the question as to the eight hour standard entirely out of
view on the ground that the authority to permanently establish it is
so clearly sustained as to render the subject not disputable."7  Mr.
Justice McKenna, concurring, disposes of this branch of the case
with equal ease. Mr. Justice Day in his dissenting opinion asserts
with regard to the statute that "it is not an act limiting the hours
of service," and with this Mr. Justice Pitney (with whom concurred
Mr. Justice Van Devanter) agrees, but both concede, apparently,
that if it did fix an eight-hour day it would be constitutional. Mr.
Justice McReynolds in his dissenting opinion does not touch upon
this phase of the case. The ease with which this aspect of the case
was disposed of is a little surprising in view of the court's illiberal
attitude towards hours-of-work legislation in Lochner v. New York,8
where they declared that a ten-hour law was unconstitutional.
Mr. Chief Justice White in the present case in delivering the opinion
of the court on this point thought it sufficient to rely upon the two
cases upholding the Sixteen Hour Act of March 4, 19o7.' Perhaps
we have already foreshadowed in this part of the decision on the
Adamson Law the liberalized attitude of the court towards hours-of-
5State v. Lumber Co., 102 Miss. 8o2 (1912), aff'd on rehearing, 103 Miss. 263
(1912); State v. Bunting, 71 Ore. 259 (1914), aff'd, by Supreme Court of United
States sub nom. Bunting v. Oregon, not yet reported; People v. Klinck Packing
Co., 214 N. Y. 121 (1915).6Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Int. Com. Com., 221 U. S. 612 (1911);
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 112 (1913).7Citing Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Int. Com. Com., and Missouri, Kansas
& Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, supra, note 6.
8198 U. S. 45 (1905).
9C. 2939, 34 Stats. at Large, 1415. See note 6, supra.
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work legislation, actually made effective in their more recent decision
in the case of Bunting v. Oregon,' where a statute establishing a ten-
hour day for all mills and manufacturing establishments was sus-
tained.
The more troublesome question in the case, and the one which
called forth a more radical pronouncement on the part of the court,
was whether the statute was constitutional when viewed as a regula-
tion of wages. The court had to answer the question, "Can Congress
legislate as to the amount of wages to be received by railroad em-
ployees?"
It is true that in the past pilot's fees have been fixed by legislation,"
and the methods of paying wages in certain businesses have also
been regulated." But the regulation of pilot's fees stands upon long
established practice* going back hlmost to the time of the settlement
of this country, and is justified as a measure to protect ship owners
who are by statute compelled to take pilots; and the statutes regulat-
ing methods of paying wages have been upheld on the ground that
the employees need this kind of protection.3 While the cases
above referred to take from the decision upholding the Adamson
Law as a regulation of wages the shock of absolute novelty, they do
not supply the principle upon which the law as a wage regulation
was upheld. It was not upheld as a protection of the wage-earner
or of the employer, but as a protection of interstate commerce.
It is declared by the majority of the court that Congress has complete
power to protect interstate commerce, and if such commerce is
threatened with interruption by the inability of railroads and their
employees to agree as to wages, Congress may impose terms which
both parties must accept. Four judges dissented strongly from the
decision of the court upholding the law as a wage regulation. Mr.
Justice Pitney, Mr. Justice Van Devanter and Mr. Justice McRey-
nolds declared that the fixing of wages of interstate railroad employees
is not a regulation of commerce, but of the internal affairs of commerce
carriers. The answer of the majority is, in effect, that Congress was
given power over interstate commerce to preserve it, and that any act
necessary to preserve it is necessarily a constitutional regulation.
lONot yet reported. See note 5, supra.
nEx parte McNeil, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 236 (1871); Nickerson v. Mason, 13 Wend.
(N. Y.)64 (1834).
2Patterson v. The Bark Eudora, i9 o U. S. 169 (I9O3); Erie R. R. Co. v. Wil-
liams, 233 U. S. 685 (1914).
13An Oregon statute authorizing a commission to fix minimum wages for women
and minor workers was upheld in Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Ore. 519 (1914), just
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States but not yet reported. The
Supreme Court was divided four to four, Mr. Justice Brandeis not voting. He,
however, of course, believes in the constitutionality of the statute.
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Mr. Justice Day agrees that "Congress has the power to fix the
amount of compensation necessary to secure a proper service and
to insure reasonable rates to the public upon the part of the railroads
engaged in such traffic," but insists that this must be done by due
process and not arbitrarily, and that Congress in increasing wages
first, throwing the burden of such increase on the railroads, and
investigating afterwards, acted arbitrarily, and so unconstitutionally.
Although the court held that Congress can fix wages of interstate
railroad employees when a wage dispute threatens to interrupt
interstate commerce, the Chief Justice in expressing the opinion
of the court says: "It is also equally true that as the right to fix by
agreement between the carrier and its employees a standard of wages
to control their relation is primarily private, the establishment and
giving effect to such an agreed-on standard is not subject to be con-
trolled or prevented by public authority." This would seem to mean
that an attempt on the part of Congress to authorize the Interstate
Commerce Commission generally to fix wages would be unconstitu-
tional, and yet this might be the most satisfactory way to prevent
repeated wage disputes. The opinion seems to restrict the power of
Congress to the fixing of wages only when there is dispute.
In the opinion of the court the Chief Justice says that the passage
by Congress of the Adamson Law amounts in substance and effect
"to an exertion of its authority * * * to compulsorily arbitrate
the dispute between the parties * * * a power none the less
efficaciously exerted because exercised by direct legislative act instead
of enactment of other and appropriate means providing for the bring-
ing about of such result." And again at the end of the opinion he
says that the statute may be viewed "as the exertion by Congress
of the power which it undoubtedly possessed to provide by appro-
priate legislation for compulsory arbitration * * * a power
which inevitably resulted from its authority to protect interstate
commerce in dealing with a situation like that which was before it."
These are most important declarations. Clearly Mr. Justice Pitney,
Mr. Justice Van Devanter and Mr. Justice McReynolds do not
accede to them, and Mr. Justice Day insists that this point did not
have to be decided, and that its decision should not have been
anticipated.
At another point in the court's opinion the Chief Justice says that
"whatever would be the right of an employee engaged in a private
business to demand such wages as he desires, to leave the employ-
ment if he does not get them and by concert of action to agree with
others to leave upon the same condition, such rights are necessarily
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subject to limitation when employment is accepted in a business
charged with a public interest." Since the court declares that com-
pulsory arbitration is constitutional, it seems necessarily to follow
that Congress can by statute prohibit a strike pending or after arbi-
tration. But does the court mean that it is illegal for employees
to agree to quit in unison, though there be no statutory prohibition,
and further is it illegal for them to do so individually and may
parties so quitting be enjoined from doing so? A Circuit Court
once held that employees of a railroad who threatened to quit their
employment without giving reasonable notice might be enjoined, but
the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision. 15
Two suggestions in the dissenting opinions deserve serious con-
sideration as forecasting the legislation which may flow from the
court's decision in upholding the right of Congress to settle the price
which railroads are to pay for labor. The first is found in this
sentence in Mr. Justice Pitney's opinion: "If it [Congress] may
impose its arbitral award upon the parties in a dispute about wages
it may do the same in the event of a dispute between the railroads
and the coal-miners, the car-builders, or the producers of any other
commodity essential to the proper movement of traffic." This
sentence shows with almost startling frankness what the decision of
the court involves, but does not seem to overstate the possible
results -of that decision. The other suggestion referred to is in Mr.
Justice McReynold's opinion, where he says: "But considering
the doctrine now affirmed by a majority of the Court as established,
it follows as of course that Congress has power * * * * to take
measures effectively to protect the free flow of such commerce against
any combination whether of operatives, owners, or strangers."
Does this suggest the possibility of federal legislation, for instance,
fixing wages in case of dispute in businesses whose products are
shipped in interstate commerce? We have here a wide field for
speculation, but it is at least obvious that the decision upholding
the Adamson Law is of great importance, and will be far reaching in
its results.
4Farmer's L. & T. Co. v. Northern Pacific Co., 6o Fed. 803 (1894).
lsArthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310 (1894).
